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This paper investigates causes of the recent sharp decline in the money multiplier in Japan from the 
bank side. Two candidates for the cause are examined: the first is the worsening of the banks’ 
financial soundness, and the second is the zero interest rate policy. Using panel data of banks’ 
balance sheets, it is shown that both can contribute to a decline in the responsiveness of loans to a 
base money expansion. Quantitatively, the low interest rate is the more important among the two. 1 Introduction 
 
This paper investigates causes of the recent decline in the money multiplier in Japan. 
Using a panel data set of Japanese banks, I estimate how the elasticities of reserves and 
loans to monetary base are affected (or not affected) by candidates for the cause of this 
decline. Two such candidates are considered. The first one is the increased financial 
fragility of the banks. The second is the very low level of the interest rate. 
 
Currently, there is a strong political pressure on the Bank of Japan to ease its policy 
stance. It is argued that, even though the short term interest rate has practically hit the 
lower bound of zero, the Bank can still stimulate the economy through printing more 
money. A potential problem with such a policy proposal is that the money multiplier 
has declined sharply in Japan. Figure 1 shows the time series behavior of the Japanese 
money multiplier, which is defined as money supply (M2+CD) divided by monetary 
base. The recent decline in the multiplier is evident. If the “average” multiplier is 
falling down in recent years, the “marginal” multiplier, defined as an increase in 
money supply generated by a unit increase in monetary base, seems to have reached its 
bottom. Figure 2 compares the annual growth rates of monetary base and money 
supply. While the growth rate of monetary base has experienced volatile movements 
recently, that of money supply stayed almost constant, without showing even a sign of 
responding to the ups and downs of base money growth. This tendency is even more 
evident in Figure 3 in which the month-to-month growth rates (annualized) of the two 
are compared for the most recent two years. Thus, it is not clear if an expansion of 
monetary base by the central bank, even an aggressive one, would lead to an increase 
in money supply in the private economy. And if the policy cannot influence money 
supply, it would be very difficult to stimulate the private economic activities with such 
means. 
 
One factor which is often cited to as the principal cause of the decline in the money 
multiplier is the unhealthy banking sector crippled by non-performing loans problem. 
It is said that, because private banks, facing possibilities of defaults on existing loans, 
are unwilling to take further risks, additional base money supplied to them is used 
mostly to build up reserves and it does not induce them to lend more. Another 
possibility is the extremely low interest rate. Figure 4, which shows the recent 
movements in the short term interest rate (call rate, which plays a role similar to that of 
the federal funds rate in the US monetary policy): it has not exceeded 0.25% since 
  1September 1998, and, at the moment when this paper is written, it is as low as 0.001%. 
Under such a situation, banks that receive additional base money become almost 
indifferent between lending it out and keeping it as non-interest-bearing reserves. With 
even a slight chance of default, they may actually prefer to keep it as a part of reserves. 
 
It is important to know which cause is the dominant one. If the banking sector problem 
is the main cause, we can expect that a quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan, 
coupled with a decisive action to clean up the banking sector, might be enough to lift 
the Japanese economy. On the other hand, if the low interest rate is the main cause, we 
may first have to find a way to leave the zero interest rate bound without causing too 
much negative impact on the private economy, which is admittedly a difficult task. 
 
In this paper, I estimate how banks’ financial soundness and the market interest rate 
change banks’ reactions to additional base money. I use a panel data of Japanese banks’ 
financial statements between 1975 and 2002 to study how the elasticities of bank 
reserves and loans depend on their financial soundness and the interest rate. It is shown 
that raising the interest rate is more crucial for “reviving” the money multiplier than 
improving the banks’ financial situation. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I explain the basic empirical 
approach. Section 3 reviews papers that are directly related to this one. Section 4 
explains the data. Sections 5-7 present estimation results. Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2 Empirical Specification 
 
The objective of this study is to estimate the effects of the zero interest rate policy and 
the deterioration of the Japanese banks’ financial soundness on the responses of the 
banks to aggregate monetary base growth. To that end, I will use bank-level panel data 
on reserves and loans and estimate how their elasticities with respect to aggregate 
monetary base are affected by the interest rate and financial soundness of the banks. 
First, consider the following basic equation: 
 
YGi,t =   (constant) + a0 YGi,t-1 +a1 MBGt  
+ a2 HEALTHi,t + a3 RATEt + ui,t   (1) 
 
  2In the above equation, subscript i stands for a bank and t stands for a year. YG stands 
for growth rate of either reserves or loans. Lagged dependent variable, YGi,t-1, is 
included on the right hand side to take into account possible persistence or mean 
reversion in this variable. MBG and RATE stand for the aggregate monetary base 
growth rate and the short term interest rate, which are macroeconomic variables and 
thus are common to all the banks in each period. HEALTH is an indicator for bank’s 
financial soundness. In this paper, I will consider three alternative indicators: the first 
one is the capital-loans ratio (a higher value means that the bank is better prepared for 
risks of defaults and bank runs); the second one is the share of non-performing loans in 
total loans; the third one is the share of loans designated to firms in three major 
financially troubled industries in Japan, namely construction, real estates, and 
distribution. Finally, ui,t is the error term. 
 
In the above basic specification, the elasticity of YG with respect to MBG is assumed to 
be time invariant. An important hypothesis in this paper is that this elasticity actually 
changes over time, depending on either the bank’s financial healthiness (HEALTH) or 
the short term interest rate (RATE), or both. This hypothesis is tested through 
estimating the following augmented equation: 
 
YGi,t   =  (constant)  +  a0 YGi,t-1 +a1 MBGt  
 +  a2 HEALTHi,t + a3 RATEt  
 + a12 HEALTHi,t *MBGt +a13 RATEi,t *MBGt + ui,t  (2) 
 
In equation (2), two interaction terms are added to the basic equation (1). By testing 
whether the coefficients on those terms are significantly different from zero, we can 
test whether the elasticities of reserves and loans with respect to MBG are functions of 
HEALTH and RATE. And, if they are indeed significant, by examining the magnitudes 
of those coefficients, we can evaluate the quantitative importance of this dependence. 
 
 
3 Related Work 
 
Various studies have investigated the relationship between the financial situation of 
banks and their lending behavior in Japan, mainly from the viewpoint of the credit 
crunch hypothesis. Yoshikawa, Eto and Ike (1994) examine the cross-section data of 
banks from March 1993. They regress loans growth on the share of nonperforming 
  3loans in total loans, both for the entire sample and for various sub-groups defined by 
bank types and borrower types. They find negative effects only for a limited number of 
groups (and not for the entire sample). Especially, in the category of lending to small 
and medium firms, which they are primarily interested in, they do not find any 
negative effects at all. Honda, Kawahara and Kohara (1995) use a panel data of 
Japanese banks to show that both the capital loans ratio and the share of nonperforming 
loans have negative impacts on loans growth of “city” banks in Japan, though the 
effects are weak. They do not find similar effects for smaller “regional” banks. Ito and 
Sasaki (1998) use a panel data of major Japanese banks (for the period between 1990 
and 1993) to study the impact of the Basle capital standard on their lending. They find 
that, when the stock prices decline, the banks with lower risk-based capital ratios tend 
to reduce their lending to meet the BIS standard. Woo (1999) studies effects of capital 
loans ratio on banks’ asset growth and loan growth using a panel data of Japanese 
banks (for the period between 1990 and 1997). He finds that, although the capital ratio 
has the expected positive effect on asset growth, its effect on loans growth is 
insignificant. Then he turns to a series of cross section regressions for each year, and 
finds that the capital ratio had a significantly positive impact on loans growth only in 
1997, the year of a huge financial distress. 
 
Hosono (2002) is most closely related to this study. His paper uses the same data set as 
this one (though mine is updated by three years) and investigates how the banks’ 
financial situation affects the response of loans to changes in the interest rate. He finds 
that loans become more responsive when capital-loans ratio is higher and the share of 
liquid assets in total assets is lower. In contrast, in this paper, I investigate the effects of 
banks’ financial situation on the responsiveness of reserves and loans to monetary base 
growth. Hence, this paper is looking at a different policy instrument than that of 
Hosono’s. Also, the main purpose of this paper is to compare those effects with the 
influence of the interest rate. 
 
 
4 Data Source 
 
The main data source used in this paper is Nikkei Quick Information Technology 
Corporation’s NEEDS financial statements data CD-ROM (version 2002). This 
  4contains information from financial statements of all the commercial banks
1 that 
existed in Japan between September 1974 and March 2002. The number of banks in 
the data set varies over time, mostly due to mergers. For example, in 1975, there were 
158 banks in the data. In 2002, the number was down to 128. I exclude banks that have 
experienced mergers during a particular fiscal year from the data set, and they are 
treated as new banks from the following fiscal year
2. From this data set, I retrieve the 
values of loans outstanding
3 and bank reserves outstanding, as well as the values of 
capital, non-performing loans and industrial composition of bank loans. The Japanese 
fiscal year starts in April and ends in March. The data set contains information from 
midterm financial statements in September for a few early years and those in March for 
all the years. In this paper I will focus exclusively on March reports so that the lengths 
of the intervals between data points are always the same. 
 
Macroeconomic data, specifically monetary base (monthly average, seasonally 
adjusted and adjusted for reserve requirement changes) and the short term interest rate 
(call rate, with collateral, monthly average) are from the Bank of Japan web page. The 
growth rate of monetary base is defined as its March-to-March rate of change. The 
interest rate is measured by the average during the month of March. 
 




5 Main Results 
 
In this section, I will use Capital-Loans Ratio, denoted as CAPITAL, as the indicator of 
financial soundness of the banks (i.e., “HEALTH” in equations (1) and (2)). In section 
7, I will check robustness of the results by using alternative indicators of financial 
soundness. Note that an increase in the value of this variable means greater capital 
adequacy and thus greater financial soundness. 
 
                                                 
1  This does not include credit unions (“Shinyo-kumiai” or “Shinyo-kinko) or 
cooperatives. On the other hand, trust banks and long term credit banks are included. 
2  The CD-ROM contains information on mergers (as well as acquisitions of branches 
from other banks), including those between commercial banks and credit unions. 
3  I added loans in the regular account (bank account) and loans in the trust account to 
compute total loans. 
  5First, the basic equation without the interaction terms, equation (1), is estimated. When 
HEALTH=CAPITAL is assumed, this equation takes the form: 
 
YGi,t   = (constant) + a0 YGi,t-1 +a1 MBGt  
   +  a2 CAPITALi,t + a3 RATEt + ui,t.   (1’) 
 
This equation is estimated by OLS, pooling all the data. Table 1 reports the result. 
 
 
Table 1: Aggregate Monetary Base Growth and Growth in Bank Asset Components 
Bank Health Variable = Capital/Loans Ratio 



































R**2 0.183  0.545 
Sample Size  3790  3831 
(Note: Constant terms are omitted from the table but are included in the estimation.) 
 
The first column reports the result for bank reserves and the second column is for bank 
loans. Starting with reserves, the first three coefficients are strongly significant. The 
coefficient on the lagged reserves growth is negative, which indicates a tendency for 
mean reversion. The same tendency will show up in all the results that will follow. The 
coefficient on monetary base growth is positive and very large, suggesting that (at least 
on average) bank reserves respond very strongly to monetary base expansions. The 
coefficient on capital-loans ratio is positive, indicating that a more financially sound 
bank would tend to build up more reserves. As such a bank seems to have less need to 
keep more reserves, this finding is not necessarily easy to reconcile with our prior 
expectation. The coefficient on the short term interest rate is negative as expected, but 
  6it is not significant. 
 
Turning to the second column, the estimated coefficients for the loans equation are all 
significant and of expected signs. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is 
positive, indicating persistence in this variable. The coefficient on monetary base 
growth is positive though it is much smaller than the one in the reserves equation. The 
coefficient on CAPITAL is positive, indicating that a more financially sound bank can 
expand its lending more aggressively. The coefficient on RATE is also positive, 
indicating that, when the interest rate is high, banks are more willing to lend. 
 
Next, the equation with interaction terms, equation (2), is estimated. Under the 
assumption that HEALTH=CAPITAL, this equation becomes: 
 
YGi,t  =  (constant)  +  a0 YGi,t-1 +a1 MBGt  
 +  a2 CAPITALi,t + a3 RATEt  
 + a12 CAPITALi,t *MBGt +a13 RATEi,t *MBGt + ui,t.  (2’) 
 
The estimation results are summarized in the first panel of Table 2. To facilitate 
understanding, after the estimated coefficients, I report coefficients on MBG, CAPITAL, 
and  RATE, evaluated at the overall sample means. They are called “average 
coefficients” for short. For example, the average coefficient on MBG is defined as 
RATE a CAPITAL a a ⋅ + ⋅ + 13 12 1  
where the upper-bars indicate the overall sample averages. Likewise, the average 
coefficients on CAPITAL and RATE are evaluated at the sample mean of MBG. 
 
 
  7Table 2: Aggregate Monetary Base Growth and Growth in Bank Asset Components 
Bank Health Variable = Capital/Loans Ratio 













































Avg. coef. on    MBG  2.292 0.348 
 CAPITAL  3.405 0.210 
 RATE  -1.058 0.560 
R**2 0.200  0.587 
Sample Size  3790  3831 
 
coef. on MBG when     
CAPITAL=0.06, RATE=0.00 6.115 -0.042 
CAPITAL=0.07, RATE=0.00 6.608 -0.023 
CAPITAL=0.06, RATE=0.01 5.323 0.058 
(Note: Constant terms are omitted from the table but are included in the estimation.) 
 
 
Comparison between the estimated coefficients in Table 1 and the average coefficients 
in Table 2, it is apparent that the average tendencies are similar, at least qualitatively, 
between the two tables. What is most notable in Table 2 is that all the interaction terms 
are significant. Starting with the first column, the elasticity of bank reserves growth 
with respect to monetary base growth is positively related to CAPITAL and is 
  8negatively related to RATE. The former result is again a little bit difficult to explain 
because it means that banks with more adequate capital are likely to increase their 
reserves more strongly in response to a monetary base expansion than those with lower 
capital adequacy. The latter result indicates that, when additional monetary base is 
supplied to the banks, they are more likely to keep it as their own reserves under a low 
interest rate. Turning to the second column, the elasticity of bank loans growth with 
respect to monetary base growth is positively related to both CAPITAL and RATE. The 
result on CAPITAL implies that, when additional base money is supplied, more banks 
with more adequate capital are more willing to use it to expand their loans than less 
sound ones. The result on RATE indicates that, when additional base money is supplied, 
banks are less willing to use it to expand their loans under a low interest rate. Hence, 
one can infer that, under the current Japanese situation with a poor financial situation 
for the commercial banks and a near-zero interest rate, it would be very difficult for the 
central bank to stimulate lending through base money expansion. And the fact that the 
coefficient on the interaction term with RATE is much greater than that with CAPITAL 
indicates that a low interest rate is more likely to contribute to a decline in the 
sensitivity of loans to monetary base. 
 
To evaluate those effects quantitatively, consider the following exercise. At the end of 
the sample (March 2002), the average value of CAPITAL across the existing banks was 
around 0.06 (to be exact, 0.0628). On the other hand, the value of RATE was about 
0.00% (0.001% to be exact). We can plug in those numbers to derive the coefficients 
on MBG evaluated at that point. This is done in the first row of the second panel of 
Table 2. In the reserves regression, this “local” coefficient on MBG was 6.115, far 
above the “average” coefficient. In the loans regression, the “local” coefficient was 
very small: in fact, it was even slightly negative (-0.042)! This indicates that additional 
base money under this situation would be used mainly to build up more reserves, and 
loans will not increase at all (or even decrease). The money multiplier would be very 
small and could even be zero or negative! The second row of the second panel asks 
what would happen if, starting from the above situation, all the banks increased their 
capital-loans ratio by 1%. In this case, the elasticity of bank reserves would increase 
even further, and there would be a small increase in the elasticity of bank loans (though 
it is still negative). The third row shows what would happen if, instead, the interest rate 
increased by 1%. In this case, the elasticity of bank reserves would decrease and that of 
loans would turn positive, though it would still be small. Thus, by moving away from 
the zero interest rate ceiling even slightly, the money multiplier would be “revived”. 
  96 Non-linearity 
 
It is conceivable that the effects of both bank balance sheet situation and the interest 
rate on the responses of the banks to monetary base expansion are non-linear. To take 
into account this possibility, I introduce quadratic terms of CAPITAL and RATE into 
the above analysis. That is, to the previous list of explanatory variables, I add four new 
variables, namely the squares of CAPITAL and RATE, and their interaction terms with 
MBG: 
 
YGi,t = (constant) + a0 YGi,t-1 +a1 MBGt  
 +  a2 CAPITALi,t + a3 RATEt + a4 CAPITAL
2
i,t + a5 RATE
2
t 
 + a12 CAPITALi,t *MBGt +a13 RATEi,t *MBGt  
 + a14 CAPITAL
2
i,t *MBGt +a15 RATE
2
i,t *MBGt  
 +  ui,t.       (3) 
 
An advantage of this approach is that we can allow for richer forms of interaction of 
CAPITAL and RATE with MBG. A drawback is that their levels tend to be highly 
correlated with their squares. Hence the standard errors around the estimates tend to be 
relatively high. Table 3 presents the estimation results. The first panel shows the 
estimated coefficients as well as the “average” coefficients (to derive them in this 
nonlinear case, I linearize equation (3) and evaluate the coefficients around the sample 
means). In the second panel, I study their quantitative implications in the same way as 
in Table 2. 
 
The average coefficient on CAPITAL in the reserves equation and that on RATE in the 
loans equation change their signs, but this might be due to the loss of accuracy of the 
estimates. In the reserves equation, the interaction term between the square of 
CAPITAL and MBG is significant. Around the sample mean, the coefficient on MBG is 
increasing in CAPITAL (as in Table 3) and takes a concave form. In the loans equation, 
the interaction term between the square of RATE and MBG is significantly negative. 
Around the sample mean, the coefficient on MBG is increasing in RATE and takes a 
concave form: that is, as the interest rate gets closer and closer to zero, the 
responsiveness of bank loans to monetary base is diminished faster and faster. 
  10Table 3: Aggregate Monetary Base Growth and Growth in Bank Asset Components 
Bank Health Variable = Capital/Loans Ratio 





































































Avg. coef. on    MBG  2.444 0.534 
 CAPITAL  -0.680 0.111 
 RATE  -12.196 -0.714 
R**2 0.237  0.637 
Sample Size  3790  3831 
 
coef. on MBG when     
CAPITAL=0.06, RATE=0.00 5.749 -0.041 
CAPITAL=0.07, RATE=0.00 5.797 -0.008 
CAPITAL=0.06, RATE=0.01 5.136 0.158 
(Note: Constant terms are omitted from the table but are included in the estimation.) 
  11The second panel of Table 3 demonstrates the following. Around the values in March 
2002, the elasticity of bank reserves changes in ways that are very similar to the ones 
found in Table 2. On the other hand, the elasticity of bank loans becomes even more 
sensitive to small changes in the interest rate. Just by raising the interest rate from zero 
to one percent, the elasticity goes up from (practically) zero to respectable 0.15. Hence, 
by introducing nonlinearity into the estimation, we learn that the zero interest rate 
policy has actually had even more destructive effects on the money multiplier than was 
suggested by the results in Table 2. 
 
 
7 Alternative Measures of Financial Soundness 
  
In this section, I use two alternative measures of banks’ financial soundness, to check 
robustness of the previous results. 
 
  7-1 Bad Loans 
 
The first alternative is the share of non-performing loans in total loans. This variable 
will be denoted as BAD, and is measured as the sum of “credit to borrowers in 
bankruptcy” and “delinquent credit”. Banks started reporting these numbers only in 
1993, hence the sample size is going to be severely limited. Also, this is only a fraction 
of the entire non-performing loans. On the other hand, one could argue that this is a 
more direct measure of the banks’ financial soundness than the capital-loans ratio. In 
Table 4, I report results for the case without quadratic terms. 
 
The first panel of Table 4 summarizes the estimation results in the same way as in 
Table 2. Presumably because the short sample makes uncertainty around the estimates 
large, some results do not make much intuitive sense, especially for the reserves 
equation: for example, the average coefficient on MBG is hugely negative (note that 
the standard error around the coefficient for RATE*MBG is huge). However, from the 
loans equation, we learn again that both a lower interest rate and a decline in the bank 
financial soundness work negatively on the elasticity of loans to monetary base. In the 
second panel, where the coefficients on MBG are evaluated around the values of BAD 
and RATE in 2002 (the average of BAD was about 5.8%), we learn again that raising 
the interest rate is more effective in restoring the money multiplier than reducing the 
magnitude of the bad loans problem. 
  12Table 4: Aggregate Monetary Base Growth and Growth in Bank Asset Components 
Bank Health Variable = Share of Bad Loans 















































Avg. coef. on    MBG  -53.289 1.409 
 BAD  -2.501 -0.444 
 RATE  -70.467 1.182 
R**2 0.286  0.318 
Sample Size  966  976 
 
coef. on MBG when     
BAD=0.06, RATE=0.00 5.435 -0.006 
BAD=0.05, RATE=0.00 5.987 0.002 
BAD=0.06, RATE=0.01 -9.088 0.334 
(Note: Constant terms are omitted from the table but are included in the estimation.) 
 
7-2 Industrial Composition of Lending 
 
The second alternative measure of the financial soundness of the banks is the share of 
three troubled industries, namely construction, real estate and distribution, in total 
lending. It is widely believed that those three are the major sources of the bad loans 
  13problems in Japan. Hence, a higher value in this variable would suggest greater 
financial fragility. This variable will be denoted as TROUBLE. 
 
I estimate equation (2) with the assumption that HEALTH=TROUBLE. At first, I was 
using data from the entire sample period to run this regression. However, I did not get 
any significant result for this new variable TROUBLE. I therefore decided to limit the 
sample to year 1990 onwards. After all, the three industries in questions became 
troubled industries in early 1990s, after the so-called bubble collapses. Prior to that, a 
higher share of lending to these industries could not be considered as a sign of 
weakness. The results are summarized in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5: Aggregate Monetary Base Growth and Growth in Bank Asset Components 
Bank Health Variable = Share of Three Troubled Industries in Total Loans 
Sample: 1990-2002 
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Avg. coef. on    MBG  7.359 0.570 
 TROUBLE  0.329 0.008 
 RATE  0.197 0.912 
R**2 0.259  0.490 
Sample Size  1803  1813 
 
  14coef. on MBG when     
TROUBLE=0.35, RATE=0.00 6.767 -0.066 
TROUBLE=0.25, RATE=0.00 5.185 0.015 
TROUBLE=0.35, RATE=0.01 6.764 0.096 
(Note: Constant terms are omitted from the table but are included in the estimation.) 
 
 
For the reserves equation, the results do not look very good in the sense that not many 
coefficients are significant. This is presumably due to the shortened sample. But for the 
loans equation, all the coefficients are significant and the results make intuitive sense. 
In particular, as the coefficient on TROUBLE times MBG suggests, an increased share 
of the three troubled industries lowers the responsiveness of bank loans to monetary 
base. The elasticity also declines under a lower interest rate. The second panel of Table 
5 shows that, among those two factors, a lower interest rate has a greater quantitative 
impact: when evaluated around the values at the end of the sample (the average of 
TROUBLE in 2002 was 0.382), raising the interest rate by 1% has a much larger 
impact on the elasticity of loans than reducing the share of the three industries by as 





In this paper, I have studied the effects of banks’ balance sheet situation and the market 
interest rate on responses of the banks to base money expansion. I have found that, 
especially for bank loans, both factors have significant impacts. A bank with a more 
deteriorated balance sheet expands its lending less aggressively when additional base 
money is supplied from the central bank. Likewise, under a low interest rate, banks are 
less likely to lend more aggressively when monetary base expands: rather, they tend to 
keep the extra base money in the form of reserves. Through evaluating the estimated 
forms of those elasticities, I have found that, under the current situation in Japan, the 
elasticity of bank loans with respect to monetary base would be almost zero or could 
even be negative. I have also found that, to get out of this situation and to “revive” the 
responsiveness of loans, raising the market rate is more effective (in the quantitative 
sense) than cleaning up the bank balance sheets. 
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Figure 2: Growth of Money Supply and Monetary Base
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Figure 3: Recent Movements in Money Supply and Monetary Base
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